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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
D J. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C.:
Plaintiff/Appellee,:
v.:
DAEAVESTBROOK, L.L.C.:
Defendant/Appellant.:
Case No. 20040340-CA:
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the district court erred in denying SunCrest's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. on the basis of his being a necessary
witness to the underlying lawsuit within the meaning of Rule 3.7 of the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Although not specifically addressed in
Utah case law, attorney disqualification decisions are reviewed under a
bifurcated standard of review: (1) a trial court's factual findings and
1

decision on whether to disqualify are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while
(2) a trial court's interpretation of a disciplinary rule is reviewed de novo.
First, a trial court's factual findings and decision on whether to
disqualify are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Houghton v. Dep't of
Health, 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998) ("[T]he proper standard of review for
decisions relating to disqualification is abuse of discretion."); Weeks v. Ind.
Sch. Dist. No. 1-89,230 F.3d 1201,1208 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The trial court's
factual findings regarding the conduct of attorneys will not be disturbed
unless there is no reasonable basis to support those conclusions.) "An abuse
of discretion occurs if the district court's actions are 'inherently unfair' or 'if
[the appellate court] conclude[s] that 'no reasonable [person] would take the
view adopted by the district court."' State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 f 101,
63 P.3d 731 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court held
in Houghton that where the Court "has a special interest in administering the
law governing attorney ethical rules, a trial court's discretion is limited."
962 P.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
However, "in order to weigh the district court's exercise of its
discretion, [the appellate court] must resolve several purely legal questions,"
including the trial court's interpretation of an attorney disciplinary rule,
under a "de novo" review. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 1485,
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1488 (10th Of. 1990); see State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,937 (Utah 1994)
(stating Utah appellate courts "generally consider de novo a trial court's
statement of the legal rule"); Weeks. 230 F.3d at 1208 ("We review de novo
the triai court's interpretation of the applicable rates of piofessionai
responsibility/'); LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart. 876 P.2d 184,187 (Kan.
1994) ("[A] trial court's interpretation of a disciplinary rule is subject to a de
novo review. "); State v. Barnett. 965 P.2d 323, 327 (N.M. 1998) ("[T]he
abuse-of-discretion standard does not preclude an appellate court from
correcting errors premised on the trial court's misapprehension of the law.")
Thus, under the de novo standard, the appellate court must "apply [its] own
independent judgment" to the trial court's interpretation of an attorney
disciplinary rule. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas. 906 F.2d at 1488.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: SunCrest, L.L.C. (f/k/a
DAE/WestbroOk, L.L.C.) ("SunCrest") first raised the issue of Denver C.
Snuffer, Jr.'s ("Snuffer") being a necessary witness with the court in its
Motion and Memorandum to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson,
Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. ("Motion"), filed February 19,2004. (R.
2144-42; 2216-145). D.J. Investment Group L.L.C. ("D.J.")filedits
Memorandum in Opposition to SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on February 25,2004
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("Opposition"). (R. 2278-17). SunCrest filed its Reply to DJ.'s
Memorandum in Opposition to SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on March 17,2004
("Reply"). (R. 2415-295). On April 7,2004, the district court heard oral
arguments on the Motion, (R. 2445; R. 2771 at pp. 1-50), and on April 9,
2004, issued a written order denying SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify
Snuffer. (R. 2454-46). A copy of the district court's ruling is provided in
SunCrest's Addendum at Tab 1.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 3.7. Lawyer as witness.
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely
to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which another lawyer in the
lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing
so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This interlocutory appeal arises from the district court's denial of
SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and his firm as D.J.'s counsel in
the action underlying this appeal. (R. 2454-46). The underlying litigation
involves a dispute related to the November 16,2000 Settlement Agreement
("Settlement Agreement" or "Agreement") entered into between SunCrest
andDJ. (R. 793-85; R. 2215). SunCrest believes the language of the
Settlement Agreement is clear and unambiguous and believed that parol
evidence would therefore not be admitted into evidence at trial.1 (R. 1667;
1652; 1647-46; 1637; 1614; 1551). However, the district court, on
November 17,2003, declared the Settlement Agreement's critical

The Settlement Agreement is a fully integrated agreement meant to
reflect the final intent of DJ. and SunCrest. See Spears v. Warr. 2002 UT
24, f 19,44 P.3d 742,750 (holding where written agreement is "'complete
and certain... parol evidence of contemporaneous [or prior] conversations,
representations or statements will not be received for the purpose of varying
or adding to the terms of the written agreement'" (internal quotation
omitted)). Paragraph 13 of the Settlement Agreement states the Agreement
"contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and supersedes
any and all contemporaneous oral negotiations, commitments, writings and
understandings of the Parties with respect to the matters specified herein."
(R. 1614); see Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d
1382,1385 (Utah 1989) (holding an integration clause in written agreement
precludes the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of
prior or additional agreements). D.J. also believed that the paragraph was
unambiguous (R. 1903-02).

5

paragraph2 ambiguous and ruled that parol evidence would be admitted to
clarify its meaning. (R. 2004-03). Thus, not until the district court's ruling
that parol evidence would be admitted to clarify the intentions of the parties
in drafting the Settlement Agreement, did SunCrest know that Snuffer, who
participated significantly in the settlement negotiations and other key events
underlying this lawsuit, (R. 2214-13; R. 2413-11), would be a necessary
witness at trial. Given that Snuffer was one of DJ.'s principal negotiators
during settlement negotiations and key participant in the events surrounding
the settlement negotiations, his testimony will be crucial in determining the
intended effect of the Settlement Agreement and whether SunCrest made
false representations that DJ. reasonably relied upon during the
negotiations.
In response to the district court's decision to admit parole evidence,
SunCrest, on February 19, 2004, filed its Motion to Disqualify Snuffer on

Paragraph 14, the Settlement Agreement's critical paragraph, which
DJ. erroneously claims requires SunCrest to build and pay for a road
touching DJ.'s property, reads: "The parties acknowledge and agree that
under the 1997 Letter Agreement, the DJ Interests may use such southerly
road across the Micron property as shall connect to S.R. U-92 (the
'Southerly Road') for the same public use that SunCrest may use the
Southerly Road. SunCrest will not oppose any effort by the DJ Interests to
connect up any property owned by them to the Southerly Road. Any such
connection by the DJ Interests shall be the sole cost and responsibility of the
DJ Interests." (R. 1614).
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the basis of his being a necessary witness within the meaning of Rule 3.7 of
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (R. 2144-42; R. 2216-145).3 On
April 9,2004, after a full briefing on the issue and oral argument, Judge
Lynn Davis issued the district court's ruling denying SunCrest's Motion to
Disqualify Snuffer. (R. 2454-46). In its written order on the Motion to
Disqualify, the district court acknowledged that Snuffer's continued
representation of D.J. may implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. Nonetheless, the district court declined to disqualify
Snuffer because the motion was untimely, filed too late, and because
Snuffer's disqualification would inflict a significant hardship on D.J. (R.
2452).
However, in denying SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and his
firm, the district court incorrectly applied the law regarding attorney
disqualification in situations where the attorney will be a necessary witness
at trial. Specifically, the (district court erred when it (1) refused to make a
determination regarding Snuffer's role as a necessary witness, (R. 2451-50),
(2) incorrectly applied the law and facts from Zion's First National Bank v.
Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc. to the present case in determining that
3

In addition, on February 6,2004, SunCrest's counsel sent Snuffer a
letter giving him notice that SunCrest intended file a Motion to Disqualify
unless he withdrew as D.J.'s counsel. A true and correct copy of the letter
and its enclosures are provided in SunCrest's Addendum at Tab 2.
7

SunCrest filed its Motion in an untimely manner, (R. 2449-48), and (3)
failed to give appropriate weight to the prejudice and substantial hardship
SunCrest and the judicial system will suffer if Snuffer is allowed to act as
both advocate and witness at trial (R. 2450-48). In making these errors, the
district court abused its discretion.
After the district court's decision, SunCrest, on April 30,2004, filed a
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order with the Utah
Supreme Court, (R. 2484-82), which the Supreme Court subsequently
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 2507). On May 25,2004 this
Court granted SunCrest's petition and agreed to hear the disqualification
issue on appeal.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
I. INITIATION OF THE UNDERLYING LAWSUIT
The underlying lawsuit involves a dispute over a Settlement
Agreement entered into on November 16,2000 by D.J. and SunCrest. (R.
793-85; R. 2215). The Settlement Agreement settled prior litigation over
property unrelated to the present dispute between the parties. (R. 793; R.
2215). On May 7,2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of that Settlement
Agreement, thus commencing the underlying lawsuit. (R. 149; R. 2215).
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DJ.'s Second Amended Complaint alleges that during the
negotiations leading up to the signing of the Settlement Agreement,
SunCrest made false representations regarding certain easements running
over property belonging to Micron, Inc. ("Micron"), owner of property
adjacent to DJ.'s property. (R. 806, R. 2215). DJ. claimed that in entering
into the Settlement Agreement it relied on SunCrest's representations during
settlement negotiations regarding those easements and SunCrest's potential
alignment of SunCrest Drive, which was to connect SunCrest's property to
the Alpine Highway, S.R. U-92. (R. 806, R. 2215).
On November 17,2003, the district court ruled paragraph 14, the
critical paragraph in the Settlement Agreement relating to a road that was to
connect with S.R. U-92, ambiguous and stated that it would admit parol
evidence to clarify the Agreement's meaning. (R. 2004-03). Given this
ruling, the testimony of the people present during the settlement
negotiations, including Snuffer, and their respective knowledge, became
critical to the resolution of the underlying lawsuit. (R. 2215-14).
II. THE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
The negotiations leading to the Settlement Agreement took place over
roughly a two-month period. (R. 2214; R. 2172). Snuffer, DJ.'s counsel,
along with David Mast ("Mast"), DJ.'s primary member and manager, and
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Robert Christiansen ("Christiansen"), U.S. General's (another company
owned by Mast) vice president, represented D.J. in the negotiations. (R.
2214, R. 2172, R. 2165).
During an all-night negotiation session beginning the night of
November 9, 2000 and lasting into the early morning hours of November
10th, the parties completed the substantive portions of the Settlement
Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2399). At this negotiating session, Snuffer and
Christiansen represented DJ.'s interests, while Edward Grampp
("Grampp"), SunCrest's vice president, and Bruce R. Baird ("Baird") and
Michael F. Jones ("Jones"), SunCrest's counsel, represented SunCrest's
interests. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Mast did not attend this meeting. (R. 2214,
R. 2399). Furthermore, at the beginning of the meeting, Westbrook offered
D.J. $50,000 if the parties completed the Agreement during this session. (R.
2413, R. 2399). Snuffer indicated that D.J. intended to finish the
negotiations during that session to obtain the $50,000. (R. 2413, R. 2399).
During the negotiating, all parties present discussed the language of
the Settlement Agreement, including Snuffer, who negotiated nearly every
sentence. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Christiansen testified that during this meeting
the two sides discussed the "critical" paragraph 14 of the Settlement
Agreement, (R. 2214, R. 2162), which D.J. now claims requires SunCrest to
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build and pay for a road to U-92 touching D.J.'s property. (R. 1903).
However, Christiansen does not remember any details of the meeting. (R.
2214, R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer, as DJ.'s only other representative at the
meeting, is the one person on D.J.'s side who can testify as to the
discussions surrounding this critical paragraph at this critical meeting. (R.
2210).
Furthermore, Snuffer's presence at this meeting was not merely that
of a witness. (R. 2413, R. 2399-98). Throughout the evening, Snuffer,
Baird, and Jones made changes to the Settlement Agreement on Snuffer's
computer. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Moreover, Snuffer drafted some of the
Settlement Agreement language independently. (R. 2413, R. 2398). At the
conclusion of the session and after nearly every provision of the Settlement
Agreement had been negotiated, the parties had completed the substantive
portions of the Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2398). Given that the parties
completed the substantive portions of the Agreement in the required time
frame, SunCrest agreed to and eventually did pay the $50,000 to D.J. (R.
2412, R. 2398).
After the negotiating session, Snuffer sent the Settlement Agreement
to Mast, who was in Phoenix. (R. 2412, R. 2398). Mast refused to sign the
Agreement until minor changes were made. (R. 2412, R. 2398).
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Consequently, Grampp and Baird flew to Phoenix on November 14,2000 to
meet with Mast and address his last few concerns. (R. 2412, R. 2398). On
more than one occasion during the meeting, which lasted from November
14,2000 to November 16,2000, Snuffer participated by speakerphone. (R.
2412, R. 2398-97). Snuffer apparently viewed the changes as insignificant
as well since he did not represent his client in person or participate in the
entire meeting by phone. Because of the minor nature of these changes,
SunCrest did not rescind the bonus for reaching the agreement on November
10th. (R. 2412, R. 2398).
The few changes made to the Settlement Agreement in Phoenix
mostly involved minor word changes, but the substance of the agreement,
reached during the meeting at Snuffer's offices, did not change. (R. 2412,
R. 2398). The parties finalized the Settlement Agreement during the
Phoenix meeting and Mast signed it on November 16th. (R. 2412, R. 239897).
In addition to his participation in the negotiations of the Settlement
Agreement, Snuffer also communicated extensively with SunCrest, both
before and after the settlement. (R. 2214). Prior to SunCrest's purchasing
the land for the SunCrest development, Snuffer discussed the Micron
easements in detail, a key issue in the underlying lawsuit, with Jeff
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Anderson, president of SunCrest Development Corporation (the developer of
SunCrest's property). (R. 2214-13, R. 2159). In addition, Snuffer
corresponded with various parties regarding the alignment of the road
proposed to connect to S.R. U-92 and received carbon copies of most letters
written by Mast and Christiansen. (R. 2213, R. 2157-45). Furthermore,
prior to D.J.'s entering into the Settlement Agreement, Snuffer wrote
SunCrest a letter acknowledging the conflicting information he possessed
regarding the Micron easement:
We have been told of its existence (although Micron denies it)
but have never been furnished a copy of it.
(R. 2403-02).4 Thus, Snuffer's own letter demonstrates that he, while acting
on behalf of D.J., had actual knowledge that Micron, on at least one
occasion, denied the existence of SunCrest's easement on an alignment
adjacent to DJ.'s property. (R. 2413, R. 2403-02).
III. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
As previously stated, on November 17, 2003, the district court
declared paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement ambiguous and ruled
that it would admit parol evidence to clarify the Settlement Agreement's
meaning. (R. 2004-03). After this ruling, SunCrest came to the conclusion
that it would need Snuffer's testimony regarding the settlement negotiations,
4

The grants at issue are publicly recorded documents. (R. 1545-19).
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and representations and/or reliance thereon concerning any easement over
Micron property to resolve the underlying dispute. (R. 2215-14; R. 2210).
Mast, D.J.'s principal, did not attend the negotiating session at Snuffer's
offices where the parties reached agreement on the substantive portions of
the Settlement Agreement. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Consequently, Mast cannot
testify as to the negotiations. (R. 2214). Furthermore, Christiansen testified
that he does not remember the details of the negotiating session. (R. 2214,
R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer, as D.J.'s only other representative at the
meeting, is the one person on D.J.'s side who can testify as to the
discussions surrounding this critical paragraph. (R. 2210).
In light of the district court's November 17th ruling rendering
Snuffer's testimony necessary to resolve the underlying dispute, SunCrest
filed its Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and his firm on February 19, 2004.
(R. 2144-42; 2216-145). On April 7, 2004 the court heard oral argument on
the Motion to Disqualify Snuffer (R. 2445; R. 2771 at pp. 1-50), and on
April 9,2004, the district court issued its ruling denying SunCrest's Motion.
(R. 2454-46). In ruling on the Motion to Disqualify, the district court
acknowledged that Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. may implicate
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Despite this
acknowledgment, the district court declined to disqualify Snuffer, on the
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grounds that the motion was untimely and that Snuffer's disqualification
would inflict a significant hardship on D.J. (R. 2452).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In reaching its conclusion that Snuffer is not a necessary witness, the
district court committed a series of errors that reflect a misunderstanding of
the rules concerning attorney disqualification in situations where an attorney
will be a necessary witness at trial. Allowing these errors to stand would be
inherently unfair, prejudicing not only SunCrest, but the judicial system as
well.
First, the district court legally erred when it refused to make a
determination regarding Snuffer's role as a necessary witness pursuant to
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. In denying SunCrest's
Motion to Disqualify, the district court ruled that Snuffer's continued
representation of D.J. "may implicate" Rule 3.7, but refused to determine
whether or not Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary" witness because
SunCrest's request was untimely and would impose a "significant hardship"
on DJ. (R. 2452). However, the exceptions to disqualification under Rule
3.7, including the "substantial hardship" exception, apply only if the lawyer
is "likely to be a necessary witness." See UTAH R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.7.
Thus, the district court legally erred when it refused to determine whether
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Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary witness" before addressing the
exceptions to disqualification enumerated in Rule 3.7.
This determination was also error because the case law and the facts
presented to the district court demonstrate that Snuffer is a necessary witness
in the underlying litigation. Snuffer participated significantly in the
settlement negotiations, as both a negotiator and drafter, and in other key
events in the lawsuit underlying this appeal. (R. 2214-13; R. 2413-11). His
testimony will therefore be crucial in determining the intended effect of the
Settlement Agreement, the document at the heart of the underlying litigation,
and whether SunCrest made false representations to DJ. during the
settlement negotiations, as D.J. alleges in its Complaint.
Second, the district court, in determining that SunCrest's motion was
untimely, incorrectly applied the law and facts from Zion's First National
Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc.. a case involving disqualification of an
attorney for a conflict of interest, to the facts of the present case, involving a
disqualification motion based on counsel's being a necessary witness. The
motion to disqualify in Jensen involved a conflict regarding a prior
representation that should have been readily apparent to the party seeking
the disqualification.

16

The basis for disqualification in the present case was not readily
apparent until the district court ruled, on November 17,2003, that parol
evidence would be admitted to clarify the intentions of the parties in drafting
the Settlement Agreement. Until this ruling, SunCrest had always contended
that the language of the Settlement Agreement was clear and unambiguous
and that parol evidence would therefore not be admitted into evidence at
trial. (R. 1667; 1652; 1647-46; 1637; 1614; 1551). Because SunCrest did
not know until November 17,2003 that Snuffer would be a necessary
witness at trial, SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify, filed only three months
after this determination, was not untimely.
Finally, the district court, in deciding DJ. would suffer a substantial
hardship were the motion granted, failed to balance the interests of both
parties as required by Rule 3.7. See UTAH R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.7.,
Comment. Instead, the district court only considered the hardship DJ.
would suffer. (R. 2450-48). This one-sided consideration was improper
under Rule 3.7. Moreover, the district court erred when it failed to balance
the interests of the parties because the case law and the facts presented to the
district court demonstrate, that SunCrest and the judicial system as a whole
would suffer "substantial hardship" if Snuffer is allowed to continue as
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DJ.'s counsel since his roles as both advocate and witness may confuse the
jury and taint the trial as well as any further proceedings in this case.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
DISQUALIFY SNUFFER AS A NECESSARY WITNESS TO
THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION.
In denying SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and his firm, the
district court incorrectly applied the law regarding attorney disqualification
in situations where the attorney will be a necessary witness at trial to the
facts of the present case. First, the district court erred legally in refusing to
make a determination regarding Snuffer's role as a necessary witness.
Second, the district court, in determining that SunCrest's motion was
untimely, incorrectiy applied the law and facts from Jensen to the present
case. Finally, the district court, in deciding that D.J. would suffer a
substantial hardship were the motion granted, failed to give appropriate
weight to the prejudice and substantial hardship SunCrest and the judicial
system will suffer if Snuffer were allowed to act as both advocate and
witness at trial.
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A. The District Court Erred When It Refused to Make a
Determination Regarding Snuffer's Role as a Necessary
Witness.
In denying SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify, the district court ruled
that Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. "may implicate" Rule 3.7, but
refused to determine whether or not Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary"
witness to the underlying litigation. (R. 2452). The district court legally
erred in not first determining whether Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary
witness" at trial. See UTAH R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.7. Moreover, the district
court's failure to determine whether Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary
witness" was error because the case law and the facts presented to the
district court demonstrate that Snuffer is a necessary witness in the
underlying litigation.
1. The District Court's Refusal to Make an Initial
Determination As to Whether Snuffer Was Likely to
Be a Necessary Witness Constitutes Legal Error.
The district court legally erred when it refused to determine whether
Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary witness." See DiMartino v. Dist. Ct.,
66 P.3d 945, 947 (Nev. 2003) (overruling the district court's disqualification
decision where, among other errors, the "district court [] did not determine
whether [the attorney] was likely to be a necessary witness"; interpreting
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Nevada SCR 178, identical to Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct). Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial
hardship on the client.
UTAH R. PROF'L CONDUCT

3.7 (emphasis added).5 Thus, the exceptions to

disqualification under Rule 3.7 apply only if the lawyer is "likely to be a
necessary witness." See Kehrer v. Nationwide Ins. Co.. 21 Pa. D. & C. 4th
385,389 (1994) ("[T]he threshold issue is whether counsel is 'likely to be a
necessary witness;'" interpreting identical Rule 3.7 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Professional Conduct). Therefore, the district court made an error
of law, subject to de novo review, when it rendered its ruling on Snuffer's
disqualification without first determining whether Snuffer was "likely to be
a necessary witness" before addressing the exceptions to disqualification

Although the Rules of Professional Conduct, standing alone, do not
bind Utah courts, the courts have followed these rules, thereby establishing
the Rules of Professional Conduct as binding law through precedent. Utah
"case law unambiguously recognizes that trial courts have the inherent
authority not only to find violations of their rules or ethics code, but also to
impose appropriate remedies for the enforcement of those rules . . . [T]o
hold otherwise would reduce the Rules of Professional Conduct to near
uselessness." Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, f 18,34 P.3d 194,
200.
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enumerated in Rule 3.7. Allowing this error to stand would be inherently
unfair to SunCrest because Snuffer's testimony at trial and his acts as
counsel may have an undue influence on a jury and will taint the trial.
2. Snuffer is a Necessary Witness Because He
Participated Extensively in Settlement Negotiations
and Has First-Hand Knowledge of Facts Material to
the Underlying Lawsuit.
Had the district properly applied the law and determined whether
Snuffer was "likely to be a necessary witness," the case law and the facts
presented required the district court to find that Snuffer is a necessary
witness in the underlying litigation. Failure to find such is an abuse of
discretion. Snuffer's continued representation of DJ. in the underlying
lawsuit violates the ethical obligations of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct and will also taint further legal proceedings in this litigation.
Consequently, Snuffer should have been disqualified from further
participation in this case.
'"That counsel should avoid appearing both as advocate and witness
except under special circumstances is beyond question.'" State v. Leonard.
707 P.2d 650,653 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Morris. 714 F.2d
669, 671 (7th Cir. 1983); interpreting prior ethical Rule 5-102(A)).
Consequently, "[t]he great weight of authority [] is that it is error for counsel
to continue representation where he or she is or ought to be a witness with
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respect to issues that are not incidental or insignificant." Leonard. 707 P.2d
at 653; see World Youth Day, Inc.. v. Famous Artists Merch. Exch.. Inc..
866 F. Supp. 1297,1302 (D. Colo. 1994) (stating counsel should have
"disqualified himself before the motion to disqualify was filed since the
moving party "reasonably believe [ed]" he was a "necessary trial witness;"
invoking identical Rule 3-7 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct);
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 04-02, April 19,2004
at % 6 ("The attorney should not continue the representation when she is or
ought to be a witness with respect to issues that are not incidental or
insignificant."), a copy of which is provided in SunCrest's Addendum at Tab
3.
A lawyer is a "'necessary' witness if his or her testimony is relevant,
material and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day. 866 F. Supp. at
1302; see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061,1066 (Utah
1991) (noting the "need for the testimony of counsel must be compelling and
. . . necessary"). Specifically, where the attorney may be a witness because
of his role as a negotiator or drafter of an agreement, the general rule is "he
must be disqualified." Tiuman v. Canant, No. 92 Civ. 5813 (JFK), 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6626, *12 (S.D.N. Y. May 19,1994), a copy of which is
provided in SunCrest's Addendum at Tab 4; see World Youth Day. 866 F.
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Supp. at 1302 (disqualifying a lawyer who had "first-hand non-privileged
knowledge of many relevant and material facts at issue in t[he] case,"
"extensive involvement in the [contract] negotiation process," and
participation in telephone negotiations directly relevant to the Plaintiffs
claim); Acme Analgesics; Ltd. v. Lemmon Co.. 602 F. Supp. 306, 306-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (disqualifying an attorney and hisfirmbecause he
negotiated the contract upon which the case was brought and would likely be
a material witness at trial for that reason).
Snuffer's knowledge regarding the settlement negotiations is
"relevant, material, and unobtainable elsewhere" (World Youth Dav. 866 F.
Supp. at 1302), because Snuffer hasfirst-handknowledge of many material
facts related to the negotiations and events that took place both before and
after the negotiations. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193,195 n.3
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating "an attorney is the agent of the client and
knowledge of any material fact possessed by the attorney is imputed to the
client"). Specifically, Snuffer is the only witness on DJ.'s side who can
testify regarding the negotiating session, which took place at his firm's
offices on November 9,2000 and November 10,2000, where the parties
reached agreement on the substantive portions of the Settlement Agreement
and reduced them to writing. (R. 2413, R. 2399).
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During the negotiating session, all parties present discussed the
language of the Agreement, including Snuffer, who negotiated nearly every
sentence. (R. 2413, R. 2399). Snuffer also drafted some of the language in
the Agreement independently. (R. 2413, R. 2398). Furthermore, Robert
Christiansen, D.J.'s only other representative at the meeting, does not
remember many details regarding this key negotiating session, but he does
remember the critical paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement, which D.J.
claims requires SunCrest to build and pay for a road to S.R. U-92 touching
DJ.'s property, being discussed. (R. 2214, R. 2164, R. 2162). Snuffer's
testimony will shed light on the discussion of this critical paragraph since he
was DJ.'s only other representative at the meeting.
Moreover, Snuffer communicated with SunCrest regularly, including
his discussion of the critical easements with Jeff Anderson, president of
SunCrest Development Corporation prior to SunCrest's acquisition of the
property. (R. 2214-13, R. 2159). His knowledge regarding these easements
is critical to establishing whether SunCrest made false representations
regarding these easements. Additionally, both before and after the
Settlement Agreement was signed, Snuffer corresponded with various
parties regarding the alignment of the road proposed to connect to S.R. U-92
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and received carbon copies of most letters written by Mast and Christiansen.
(R. 2213, R. 2157-145).
One of Snuffer's own letters demonstrates that he, while acting on
DJ.'s behalf, had actual knowledge that Micron had denied the existence of
SunCrest's easement. (R. 2413, R. 2403-02). The basis for this statement
will certainly form a critical area of questioning when Snuffer is on the
stand. Indeed, no one else can testify about why Snuffer wrote this sentence
in this letter. This sentence is critical because it refutes any suggestion that
SunCrest made a misrepresentation, as well as the claim that D.J. reasonably
relied on any representations by SunCrest regarding the easements, absent
further independent investigation. Given his involvement and first-hand
knowledge of key, material facts, Snuffer is "likely to be a necessary
witness" in the underlying litigation. Consequently, no reasonable person
would find that Snuffer was not "likely to be a necessary witness."
B. In Ruling That SunCrest's Motion Was Untimely, the
District Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Applying the
Law and Facts of Jensen to the Present Case.
The district court erred as a matter of law in applying the law and
facts from Zion's First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc. in
finding SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Snuffer and his firm untimely. The
district court stated that in Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals found that
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Jensen's motion to disqualify counsel "was untimely because it was filed
more than seven months after counsel's first appearance and more than three
months after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict." (R. 2449). On
the basis of these facts and Jensen's holding that "[a] motion to disqualify
counsel must be immediately filed and diligently pursued as soon as the
party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification," (781 P.2d 478,48081 (Utah 1989)), the district court ruled that SunCrest's motion was
untimely. (R. 2449). However, in reaching this determination, the district
court improperly applied the facts and law from Jensen, a case involving
attorney disqualification for a conflict of interest, to the facts of the present
case, which involves a motion to disqualify on the basis of counsel's role as
a necessary witness.
The circumstances in Jensen differ greatly from those in the present
case because the motion to disqualify counsel in Jensen involved a conflict
regarding prior representation that should have been readily apparent at the
outset to the party seeking the disqualification. See 781 P.2d at 481.
Furthermore, the court in Jensen did not hold that a motion to disqualify is
untimely because it is filed "three months" or "seven months" after learning
of grounds for disqualification. See id at 481. Instead, the court considered
that the motion was filed "three months" after learning of an apparent basis
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for disqualification, but also emphasized that the motion was filed only "one
day before Zion's motion to compel settlement was scheduled to be heard."
Id. at 480-81 (noting that a motion to disqualify "may not be used as a
manipulative litigation tactic"). Thus, "under these circumstances," the
Jensen court found the motion untimely. Id. at 481.
The present Motion to Disqualify, however, is based on counsel's
being a necessary witness. Under the law surrounding such
disqualifications, SunCrest would have been "premature" in filing its Motion
to Disqualify any earlier because SunCrest did not know that Snuffer would
be a necessary witness at trial until the district court's November 17,2003
ruling that parol evidence would be admitted to clarify the intentions of the
parties in drafting the Settlement Agreement.6 (R. 2004-03). Until the time
of this ruling, SunCrest had always contended that the language of the
Most parties opposing motions to disqualify counsel on the basis of
counsel's being a necessary witness argue that the motion is premature, not
that it is untimely (meaning late). See, e,g., World Youth Day. 866 F. Supp.
at 1302 (arguing disqualification motion is unnecessary and premature);
Merill Lynch Bus. Fin. Serv. v. Nudell, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1170,1173 (10th
Cir. 2003) (arguing motion to disqualify counsel as a necessary witness was
premature); Host Marriott Corp. v. Fast Food Operators, Inc.. 891 F. Supp.
1002, 1006 (D. N.J. 1995) (arguing motion to disqualify is premature at
early stages of proceedings). Moreover, if courts deny motions to
disqualify, they do so based on prematurity as opposed to untimeliness. See
e.g., Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301,1309 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding motion to disqualify under Rule 3.7 "premature where
the proceeding was not near the trial stage").

27

Settlement Agreement was clear and unambiguous and that parol evidence
would therefore not be admitted into evidence at trial. (R. 1667; 1652;
1647-46; 1637; 1614; 1551); see Spears at 2002 UT 24. <f 19.44 P.3d at 750
(holding that where written agreement is '"complete and certain . . . parol
evidence of contemporaneous [or prior] conversations, representations or
statements will not be received for the purpose of varying or adding to the
terms of the written agreement'" (internal quotation omitted)). Indeed, DJ.
agreed with SunCrest that the Setdement Agreement was unambiguous. (R.
1903-02). Because SunCrest did not know until November 17,2003 that
Snuffer would be a necessary witness at trial, SunCrest's Motion to
Disqualify, filed only months after this determination, was not untimely.7
Furthermore, as noted above, the Motion is not necessarily untimely
because it was filed more than "three months" after the basis for
disqualification became apparent. In Jensen, evidence suggested that the
motion was being used as a "manipulative litigation tactic," while no such
evidence exists in this case.8 Moreover, neither Rule 3.7 nor any case law
7

This is particularly so given that no scheduling order is in place and
that the time period between the ruling and the filing covers the
Thanksgiving and December holidays, as well as New Year's.
8

Despite DJ.'s assertions that SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify, filed
February 19, 2004, was untimely because SunCrest filed the Motion more
than three months after the district court's November 17, 2003 ruling to
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sets a three month time limit on filing a motion to disqualify after learning of
the apparent basis for disqualification. Consequently, the district court erred
as a matter of law in interpreting Jensen to establish a strict mathematical
timeline for motions to disqualify. The district court should have assessed
the timeliness of SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify in light of other such
motions based on the attorney's probable role as a witness and the
circumstances of this particular case. Under that law and the circumstances
in this case, a February filing following a November ruling, where no
scheduling order is in place, was not untimely.
C. The District Court Failed to Balance the Interests of the
Parties, as Required by Rule 3.7, When Determining That
Snuffer's Disqualification Would Work a Substantial
Hardship on D J.
The district court found that Snuffer's disqualification "would cause
substantial hardship to [D.J.]"9 (R. 2450). The ruling noted D.J. would
suffer "financial and tactical prejudice" if the motion were granted because it
admit parol evidence (R. 2771 at p. 31), the district court, during oral
argument, found this argument without merit. (R. 2771 at p. 21) ("I think
[the Motion is] timely filed post my fall decision.")
9

The only possible issue with regard to the disqualification exceptions
set forth in Rule 3.7 is whether D.J. will suffer a hardship if Snuffer and his
firm are disqualified. (R. 2209). The first two exceptions to the
disqualification rule clearly do not apply because Snuffer's testimony relates
to a contested issue, the Settlement Agreement, and because the testimony
does not relate to the value of legal services rendered. (R. 2209-08).
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would be difficult and costly for a new attorney to be brought up to speed in
the case. (R. 2449-48). However, the district court legally erred because it
never considered the prejudice and hardship SunCrest would suffer were the
motion denied, as required by Rule 3.7. Moreover, the district court abused
its discretion because no reasonable person could view the case law and the
facts presented to the district court and nonetheless determine that SunCrest
and the judicial system as a whole would not a suffer "substantial hardship"
if Snuffer continues as DJ.'s counsel.
1. The District Court Legally Erred When It Failed to
Balance the Interests of the Parties, As Required by
Rule 3.7.
Under Rule 3.7, even where a lawyer is a necessary witness, the
lawyer will not be disqualified where "[djisqualification of the lawyer would
work a substantial hardship on the client." UTAH R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.7.
To determine whether the client will suffer a "substantial hardship," "§
balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the
opposing party."

UTAHR. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.7, Comment

(emphasis

added); Thompson v. Goetz. 455 N.W. 2d 580,588 (N.D. 1990) ("Even
when it has been adequately shown that an attorney will be a 'necessary
witness,' Rule 3.7(a) envisions a balancing of the interests at stake in
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resolving the disqualification question;" interpreting similar Rule 3.7(a) of
the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct).
In determining whether D.J. would suffer a "substantial hardship," the
district court never balanced the interests between the parties. Instead, the
court only considered the hardship D.J. would suffer. (R. 2450-48). To
balance the interests of the parties, the district court must consider the
interests of both parties. See DiMartino. 66 P.3d at 947 (overruling the
district court's disqualification decision where, among other errors, the
district court "d[id] not balance the parties' interests;" interpreting identical
Rule 3.7 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure). Thus, the district court's
one-sided consideration is an error of law.
2. SunCrest Will Suffer Substantial Hardship if Snuffer
is Allowed to Continue as DJ.'s Counsel.
Had the district court balanced the interests of the parties based on the
case law and the facts presented to the district court, it would have found, as
any reasonable person would, that SunCrest will be prejudiced and will
suffer a "substantial hardship" if Snuffer is not disqualified and he is
allowed to testify since his dual roles as both advocate and witness may
confuse the jury and taint the trial as well as any further proceedings in this
case. An attorney appearing as a witness in the same trial creates a
substantial risk that the trial and legal system will be tainted by the
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appearance of the attorney in these dual roles. See World Youth Day. 866 F.
Supp. at 1303 (stating that often, "there is a substantial risk that a jury will
be confused by an advocate also appearing as a witness" and that
disqualification may be granted where "the claimed misconduct in some way
'taints' the trial or the legal system"); Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 ("It is
widely recognized that the credibility of an attorney who acts as a witness in
his client's case, as well as his effectiveness as an attorney in that case, may
be seriously compromised."). Furthermore, where any "pretrial activity
includes obtaining evidence which, if admitted at trial, would reveal the
attorney's dual role," the lawyer should be disqualified from participation in
any such activities. World Youth Day, 866 F. Supp. at 1303-04 (noting "the
testimony from oral depositions . . . cannot easily be taken and read into
evidence without revealing [the attorney's] identity as the deposing
attorney"); Freeman v. Vicchiarelli, 827 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. NJ. 1993)
(holding that New Jersey's identical Rule 3.7 operates during both the pretrial and trial stage).
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. would certainly confuse a
jury and taint the trial and any further proceedings in this matter since he
participated significantly in the events underlying this litigation. His
testimony will be crucial in determining the intended effect of the Settlement
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Agreement and whether SunCrest made false representations to DJ. His
name appears on at least half of the documents in this case. Whether Snuffer
is disqualified or not, he will testify in this case. A situation where Snuffer
would first introduce the case in his role as advocate, then testify as a
witness, and then again, as an advocate, comment upon his own testimony,
would certainly "taint" the trial and unfairly prejudice Westbrook. See
UTAHR. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.7, Comment

("The opposing party has proper

objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in
the litigation . . . [i]t may not be clear whether a statement by an advocatewitness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.").
Furthermore, Snuffer's continued participation in many pretrial activities
would also be inherently unfair since these activities would likely reveal
Snuffer's "dual role" as advocate and witness to the jury if introduced at
trial. Not only will depositions in which he participated or may participate
be read into evidence, but Snuffer will himself be deposed. These
circumstances are inherently unfair and will certainly taint the proceedings.
Moreover, the risk of jury confusion and unfairness during trial
outweighs the possible hardship D. J. might suffer if Snuffer is disqualified.
Given that the trial court has still not scheduled either a trial or discovery
cut-off date, D.J.'s new counsel would have ample time to prepare for trial
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competently. (R. 2208). Additionally, Snuffer would still be allowed to
represent D.J. in other matters and would also be able to share all of his
knowledge regarding the underlying litigation with DJ.'s new counsel.
Furthermore, if the difficulty and costly nature of obtaining a new attorney
sufficed to defeat a motion to disqualify, no motion for disqualification
based on the attorney's being a necessary witness would ever succeed, as
such motions can only be brought after the case is well underway. Thus, the
hardship D.J. would suffer is minimal compared to the prejudice both
SunCrest and the judicial system would suffer if Snuffer is allowed to
participate as both advocate and witness at trial.
Consequently, when denying the Motion to Disqualify, the district
court erred in failing to consider the prejudice and hardship SunCrest and the
judicial system would suffer were Snuffer allowed to remain as DJ.'s
counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, this Court, which "has a special interest in
administering the law governing attorney ethical rules," (Houghton. 962
P.2d at 61), should reverse the district court's denial of SunCrest's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen,
P.C. and disqualify Snuffer and his firm from acting as DJ.'s counsel at trial
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and during pretrial activities that might eventually reveal Snuffer's dual role
as advocate and witness if later admitted into evidence at trial.
Respectfully submitted this M

day of September, 2004.

BENDINGER, CROCKETT,
PETERSON, GREENWOOD &
CASEY PC
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801)533-8383
By.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SunCrest L.L.C.
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
D.J. INVESTMENT GROUP, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company,

RULING ON DAE/WESTBROOK L.L.CS
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DENVER C.
SNUFFER, JR. AND NELSON SNUFFER,
DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Plaintiff,
vs.

DAE/WESTBROOK, L.L.C., a Delaware limited^
liability company; DRAPER CITY, a municipal
corporation; JOHN DOES 1 to 15,

Civil No. 010402305
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer
Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen. Oral arguments were held on April 7,2004. Richard
Casey appeared on behalf of DAE/Westbrook ("Westbrook") and Denver Snuffer appeared on
behalf of D.J. Investment Group ("D.J."). The Court having heard oral arguments and carefully
considered the Motions and Memoranda of the Parties now makes the following ruling.
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I.
FACTUAL SUMMARY & RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. In October 2000 Westbrook entered D.J.'s property and began building a roadway in order to
conform with city regulations that required communities of 20+ dwellings to have more than one
road leading to and from the community.
2. D.J. filed a lawsuit in the 4th District Court to abate what it considered to be a trespass on the
part of Westbrook and also sued for damages.
3. On November 16, 2000 in Phoenix, Arizona, the parties created a muitifaceted agreement
containing, among other things, provisions dismissing D.J.'s lawsuit and allowing Westbrook to
continue using the access road on D.J.'s property. Denver Snuffer ("Snuffer"), D.J.'s attorney,
participated, either directly or indirectly, in the negotiation the agreement.
4. Provision 14 of the agreement allowed D.J. the use of a not-yet-created "Southerly Roadway"
that would be located on Micron property abutting D.J.'s property. The original route
contemplated would give D.J. access to State Road 92 by way of this "Southerly Road."
5- Despite Westbrook's representations that it had secured the necessary easements to construct
the Southerly Roadway, the rights to these easements may not have been obtained and Westbrook
is now preparing to build the Southerly Highway along a different route that does not provide D.J.
with any access to State Road 92. On May 7, 2001, D.J. filed suit seeking rescission of the
settlement agreement and began this current litigation.
6. On June 8, 2001, Westbrook filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint.
7. On December 20, 2002, D.J. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
8. Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on January 28, 2003.
9. D.J. filed its Reply to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on
February 5, 2003.
10. On August 7, 2003, Westbrook filed its Opposition to D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
11. On August 25, 2003, D.J. filed its Reply Memorandum to Westbrook's Opposition to D.J.'s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
12. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
August 27, 2003. Richard Casey appeared on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared
on behalf of D.J. At the conclusion of Oral Arguments the Court took the matter under
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advisement.
13. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued a ruling denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and indicating that parol evidence would be taken regarding the November 16, 2000
settlement agreement. The corresponding Order denying D.J.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was signed and filed on January 7, 2004.
14. On February 19, 2004, Westbrook filed a Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
15. On February 25, 2004, D.J. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
16. After being granted additional time to respond to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C, Westbrook filed its
Reply to D.J.'s Opposition to Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on March 17, 2004.
17. The Court heard Oral Arguments regarding Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver C.
Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. on April 7, 2004. Richard Casey appeared
on behalf of Westbrook and Denver Snuffer appeared on behalf of D.J.
18. Denver Snuffer has served as D.J.'s counsel in the case at bar from the inception of the
original litigation to the present time.
II.
ANALYSIS

Westbrook contends this Court should disqualify Snuffer in the case at bar because
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this litigation violates Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct. D.J. argues this Court should not disqualify Snuffer because Snuffer is not
a necessary witness in the case at bar and disqualifying Snuffer at this point in the litigation would
inflict substantial hardship on D.J. Although Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in the case
at bar may implicate Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court declines to
disqualify Snuffer because Westbrook's request is untimely and would inflict significant hardship
on D.J.
3

A.

SNUFFER'S ACTIONS IN THE CASE AT BAR IMPLICATE RULE 3.7

Westbrook alleges that Snuffer's representation of D.J. in the case at bar violates Rule 3.7
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered
in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the
client.
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7.

The Utah Supreme Court addressed the prohibition

against serving as counsel and witness and indicated that "[i]f an attorney attempts to combine the
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both as
advocate and witness exceptunder special circumstances is beyond question." State v. Leonard,
707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985). The Leonard Court also indicated that "application of this rule
does not depend on whether an attorney will be called b u t . . . on whether he 'ought to be called as
a witness' in the underlying action." Id.
D.J. notes that Rule 3.7 only applies when an attorney is a necessary witness during the
trial. Snuffer, D.J. contends, is not a necessary witness and therefore should not be disqualified. A
lawyer is generally only considered a necessary witness "if his or her testimony is relevant, material
and unobtainable elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F. Supp. 1297, 1302
(D. Colo. 1994). Furthermore, Utah courts have indicated that disqualification of a lawyer may
not be necessary if his or her testimony only relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues. Leonard,
707 P.2d at 653.
The factual disputes between the parties make it difficult for the Court to make a
4

conclusive determination as to whether Snuffer was sufficiently involved in the settlement
negotiations to warrant his designation as a "necessary" witness in the case at bar. Although
Westbrook and D.J. provide very different renditions of Snuffer's role in the negotiations leading
up to the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement, both accounts demonstrate that Snuffer was
present during many of the negotiation sessions and advised David Mast and Robert Christensen
on matters related to such settlement negotiations. While Snuffer's involvement may have
rendered him a "necessary" witness in the case at bar, this Court holds that it does not need to
reach such a determination because the facts of this litigation give rise to the "special
circumstances" exception contemplated in Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
B.

DISQUALIFYING SNUFFER WOULD MWORK SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP11 ON D.J.

Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct will not prevent a lawyer from
advocating at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness if "[disqualification of
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client."

UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R.

3.7. In order to determine whether a client will suffer a "substantial hardship," "a balancing is
required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party."
PROF'L CONDUCT

UTAH RULES OF

R. 3.7, Comment.

This Court, after the weighing the interests of the parties, finds that disqualifying Snuffer at
this stage of the proceedings would cause substantial hardship to D.J. The case at bar was filed in
May of 2001, almost three years ago, and since that time the parties have vigorously litigated an
extraordinary number of legal issues. The Court also notes that the parties have conducted a
significant amount of discovery in connection with this litigation. Most, if not all, of the key
witnesses have been deposed and written discovery has been sent out and answered by both
5

parties. All things considered, the parties have engaged in a substantial amount of work. Indeed,
the Court file now fills seven exceptionally thick folders and addresses some very complex legal
issues. The Clerk of the Court has just opened the eighth file. Under these circumstances, the
Court doubts another attorney could be brought up to speed in this matter and recognizes that
such an effort would require D.J. to expend an exorbitant amount of time and money.
Furthermore, this Court believes that Westbrook could have significantly reduced the costs
of bringing new counsel up to speed if Westbrook had filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver
Snuffer in a more timely fashion. In Zion 's First National Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc.,
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel must be immediately filed
and diligently pursued as soon as the party becomes aware of the basis for disqualification."
In Jensenjhe:Utafa Court of Appeals held that Jensen's Motion to Disqualify Counsel was
untimely because it was filed more than seven months after counsel's first appearance and more
than three months after Jensen became aware of the potential conflict. In contrast to Jensen,
Westbrook's own pleadings intimate that Westbrook has "reasonably foreseen," since the initiation
of this litigation, that Snuffer might be called as a witness in the case at bar.
Westbrook argues that Snuffer only became a "necessary" witness in this litigation at the
time the Court indicated that it would accept parole evidence regarding the settlement agreement.
Even if Westbrook's argument is accepted as true this Court can still find Westbrook's filing was
untimely. Westbrook filed its Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer on February 19, 2004, roughly
three months after the Court's November 17, 2003 decision to accept parole evidence on the
settlement agreement at issue. In Jensen, the Utah Court of Appeals held Jensen's Motion to
Disqualify Counsel was untimely because it was filed "more than three months" after Jensen
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became aware of the potential conflict." Jensen 781 P.2d at 481. Similarly, this Court could find
that Westbrook's Motion to Disqualify Denver Snuffer was untimely because it was filed more
than three months after Westbrook became aware of the Court's decision to accept parole
evidence regarding the November 16, 2000 settlement agreement.
But the Court must examine the entire procedural history to determine timeliness. One can
argue very persuasively that these parties were aware at the time of the filing of the lawsuit that the
alignment of the road was at issue, that arguments would focus on the court's interpretation of the
language of the settlement agreement, and that these parties knew Mr. Snuffer participated in that
settlement negotiation process to some extent. (Date: May 7, 2001)
More importantly at the time of the filing of Summary Judgment/Partial Summary
Judgment, defendants were placed on notice that plaintiffs intended to rely on a variety of
collateral documents (renderings, blueprints, bonds, etc.) to show the alignment of the subject
road. (Date: December 20,2002). If that were not enough, at oral argument on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, this position became abundantly clear. (Date: August 27, 2003).
Because disqualifying Denver Snuffer from the case at bar would result in significant
financial and tactical prejudice to D.J., and in light of Westbrook's untimely filing of its Motion to
Disqualify, this Court rejects Westbrook's motion and declines to disqualify Denver Snuffer from
this litigation.
IV.
CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the discussion outlined above, this Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to
Disqualify Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. Plaintiffs counsel is
7

instructed to prepare an order consistent with the findings contained herein.

DATED this f^

day of April, 2004.

x

L^iN W. DAVi§t V
Fourth District Court Judge
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Defendant DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C. ("Westbrook"), by and through its attorneys of
record, hereby respectfully moves this Court for an order disqualifying Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.,
plaintiff's counsel, from participating in this case.
INTRODUCTION
In this lawsuit, Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. ("Snuffer") represents the plaintiff, D.J. Investment
Group, L.L.C. ("D.J."), and plaintiffs primary member and manager, David Mast ("Mast").
Snuffer also represented D.J. and Mast during the events underlying this litigation and more

specifically, was directly involved in the negotiations of the November 16, 2000 Settlement
Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"), that forms the center of this dispute. Snuffer, as one of
the main negotiators for DJ, is a key witness to a number of the events surrounding the
Settlement Agreement. Because Snuffer's testimony regarding these events will be critical in
resolving the dispute before this Court, Snuffer is a necessary witness in the present lawsuit.
Snuffer's dual representation of D.J., in both the present lawsuit and in the events underlying this
lawsuit, violates the ethical obligations imposed by Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct and taints any further proceedings in this matter. Therefore, Westbrook respectfully
moves this Court to disqualify Snuffer and his law firm Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
from further participation in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 16, 2000, DJ. and Westbrook entered into a court-approved Settlement
Agreement settling prior litigation over property unrelated to the present lawsuit. See Settlement
Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A; D J. Am. Compl. f 20. However, on May 7, 2001, D J.
filed suit seeking rescission of the Settlement Agreement, thus beginning this lawsuit. In its
Amended Complaint, D J. complains that during the settlement negotiations, Westbrook made
false representations regarding its easements running over property belonging to Micron
Technologies, Inc., ("Micron"). See id f 20. In entering into the Settlement Agreement, D J.
claims it relied upon representations by Westbrook made during settlement negotiations
regarding those easements and the potential road alignment of SunCrest Drive, which was to
connect Westbrook's property to the Alpine Highway, S.R. U-92 ("S.R. U-92"). See id f j 20,
22. The Court has found the paragraph relating to the road connecting with S.R. U-92
ambiguous and plans to allow parol evidence to clarify its meaning. Ruling on PL's Mot. to
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Strike and Ruling on PL's Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at 12. As a result, the
testimony of those present for the settlement negotiations is critical.
The negotiations leading to the Settlement Agreement took place over a roughly twomonth period. Deposition of David Mast, July 8, 2003 at 76 ("Mast Dep."), attached hereto as
Exhibit B. Snuffer was heavily involved in the negotiations, as it was he, along with Mast and
U.S. General's (another company owned by Mast) vice president, Bob Christiansen
("Christiansen"), who were the only negotiators for D.J. See icL at 75, Ex. B; see Deposition of
Robert Christiansen, July 2, 2003 at 21 ("Christiansen Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Snuffer also "collaborated" with Westbrook's then attorneys, Bruce R. Baird and Michael F.
Jones,1 on the drafts of the Settlement Agreement. Christiansen Dep. at 25, Ex. C. Specifically,
an agreement in principle along with an agreement as to the majority of the final settlement
document language was reached after an all-night negotiation and drafting session at Snuffer's
offices. Snuffer and Christiansen, but not Mast, were present at this meeting. Id at 28, Ex. C.
Christiansen testified that during this meeting the two sides discussed the "critical" paragraph 14
of the Agreement, which D.J. claims grants it access to S.R. U-92. Id at 33, Ex. C. However,
Christiansen did not remember the details of this meeting. IcL at 28, 34, Ex. C. Additionally,
although not present during the Phoenix meeting, where the agreement was finalized, Snuffer
participated in the final negotiations by telephone conference calls and through e-mail. Id. at 25,
Ex. C.

1

Both Baird and Jones of Baird & Jones, L.C., represented Westbrook during the negotiations of the
Settlement Agreement and also participated in the drafting of the Settlement Agreement. (Baird and Jones still
represent Westbrook in the ongoing development of the SunCrest project.) Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones, who also
litigate many matters, realized the conflict that would arise if they represented Westbrook in litigation involving
matters in which they had substantially participated and in which they were likely to be called to testify.
Recognizing their ethical obligations, Mr. Baird and Mr. Jones referred the present case out to Westbrook's current
litigation counsel.
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Snuffer was also involved communications with Westbrook both before and after the
actual settlement negotiations. Prior to the settlement negotiations, Snuffer discussed the Micron
easements, a key issue in the present lawsuit, with Jeff Anderson ("Anderson"), president of
SunCrest Development Corporation Deposition of Jeff Anderson, July 8, 2002 at 35-36
("Anderson Dep."), attached hereto as Exhibit D. Snuffer told Anderson that Westbrook had
"easement rights out to U92." Id. at 36. In addition, after the Settlement Agreement was signed,
Snuffer remained heavily involved in events related to this lawsuit. Snuffer corresponded with
various parties regarding such issues as the alignment of the proposed road that was to connect to
S.R. U-92. See, e ^ , Snuffer Letter to Mike Mazuran, April 6, 2001; Snuffer Letter to Mike
Mazuran, April 11, 2001, attached hereto as Exhibit E. Furthermore, both before and after the
Settlement Agreement was signed, Snuffer was carbon copied on most letters written by Mast
and Christiansen. See, e.g., Mast Letter to Jeff Anderson, October 5, 2000, Christiansen Letter
to Jeff Anderson, January 27, 2000; Christiansen Letter to City of Draper, April 13, 2001,
attached hereto as Exhibit F. Lastly, Westbrook met with Mast and Snuffer to inform them of
Micron's unwillingness to allow the road to S.R. U-92 to be built on the west side of its property.
CITE
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISQUALIFY SNUFFER FROM REPRESENTING DJ. BECAUSE THIS REPRESENTATION VIOLATES THE
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND WILL TAINT
THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE.

This Court should disqualify Snuffer from further participation in this case because his
representation in the present lawsuit violates the ethical obligations of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct and will taint the legal proceedings in this case. The trial judge has the
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power to control attorneys' conduct in trial litigation, including disqualifying counsel after
finding an ethica] violation. Marguiis v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1985). Snuffer
has violated ethical Rule 3.7. Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.7. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged

"the role of advocate and witness should be separated. If an attorney attempts to combine the
two roles, he is likely to be less effective in each role. That counsel should avoid appearing both
as advocate and witness except under special circumstances is beyond question.'" State v.
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 671
(7th Cir. 1983); interpreting prior ethical Rule 5-102(A)). As the Comment to Rule 3.7 explains:
The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice
that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of
personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence
given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should
be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.7, Comment (emphasis added). Consequently,

"[t]he great weight of authority [] is that it is error for counsel to continue representation where
he or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues that are not incidental or
insignificant." Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. Since Snuffer is a "necessary" witness and his
disqualification would not "work a substantial hardship" on D.J., he should be disqualified from
any further representation of DJ. in this matter.
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A.

Snuffer is a Necessary Witness Because He Participated Extensively in
Settlement Negotiations and Has First-Hand Knowledge of Facts
Material to the Present Lawsuit.

Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is a "necessary" witness or "ought to be" one. A
lawyer is a "'necessary' witness if his or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable
elsewhere." World Youth Day, Inc., v. Famous Artists Merchandising Exchange, Inc.. 866 F.
Supp. 1297, 1302 (D. Colo. 1994); see also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061,
1066 (Utah 1991) (noting that the "need for the testimony of counsel must be compelling and . . .
necessary"). Therefore, if the lawyer's testimony relates to "incidental or insignificant" issues,
withdrawal or disqualification may not be necessary. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653. Furthermore,
the attorney does not necessarily have to be called as a witness; that the lawyer "ought to be a
witness" in the underlying action is enough. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653.
Specifically, where the attorney may be a witness because of his role as a negotiator or
drafter of an agreement, the general rule is that where "'a lawyer negotiates, executes and
administers a contract, and is the key witness at trial, he must be disqualified.'" Tiuman v.
Canant, No. 92 Civ. 5813 (JFK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6626, *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1994). In
World Youth Day, the court disqualified a lawyer who had "first-hand non-privileged knowledge
of many relevant and material facts at issue in t[he] case." 866 F. Supp. at 1302. The lawyer had
"extensive involvement in the negotiation process," participated in telephone negotiations
directly relevant to the plaintiffs claim, and participated in numerous other communications
with the plaintiff. Id. at 1302. Furthermore, the lawyer's testimony was "essential in
establishing whether a valid and enforceable contract was initially formed." Id. at 1303.
Likewise, the court in Acme Analgesics, Ltd. v. Lemmon Co., 602 F. Supp. 306, 306-307
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(S.D.N.Y. 1985), disqualified an attorney and his firm because he negotiated the contract upon
which the case was brought and would likely be a material witness at trial for that very reason.
Snuffer's involvement in the underlying events of the present lawsuit are almost identical
to the disqualified lawyers' involvement in World Youth Day and Acme Analgesics, given that
he participated in the negotiations and administration of the Settlement Agreement. First,
Snuffer had "extensive involvement in the negotiation process" and therefore participated in
events relevant to this lawsuit. He was one of the main negotiators on D.J.'s side, and as such,
participated in many of the negotiation sessions, including a key session held at his offices. See
Christiansen Dep. at 28, Ex. C. Furthermore, Snuffer "collaborated" with Westbrook's attorneys
on the drafts of the Settlement Agreement. Snuffer's testimony is critical in explaining the
circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement and in establishing the intent and
intended effect of the agreement. In particular, Christiansen does not remember many details
regarding the key meeting at Snuffer's office, but he does remember that the critical paragraph
14 of the Settlement Agreement was discussed. See id. at 28, 33-34, Ex. C. Snuffer's testimony
is needed to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the discussion of this critical paragraph
since he was D.J.'s only other representative at the meeting. Third, Snuffer had numerous
communications with Westbrook, including his discussion of the critical easements with
Anderson. See Anderson Dep. at 35-36, Ex. D. His knowledge regarding these easements is
critical to establishing whether Westbrook made false representations regarding these easements.
Furthermore, Snuffer participated in the administration of the agreement, corresponding with
various parties regarding such issues as the alignment of the proposed road that was to connect to
S.R. U-92. See, e.g., Snuffer Letter to Mike Mazuran, April 6, 2001; Snuffer Letter to Mike
Mazuran, April 11, 2001. Furthermore, both before and after the Settlement Agreement was
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signed, Snuffer was carbon copied on most letters written by Mast and Christiansen. See, e.g.,
Mast Letter to Jeff Anderson, October 5, 2000, Christiansen Letter to Jeff Anderson, January 27,
2000; Christiansen Letter to City of Draper, April 13, 2001. Snuffer was present when
Westbrook informed D.J. of Micron's unwillingness to allow Westbrook to build the road. This
conversation is critical to establishing the good faith belief of Westbook at the time of
negotiations and the subsequent change in circumstances.
Such involvement cannot be considered "incidental or insignificant." Instead, Snuffer's
knowledge regarding these events is "relevant, material, and unobtainable elsewhere," because
Snuffer has "first-hand knowledge" of many material facts related to the settlement negotiations
and events that took place both before and after the negotiations. Specifically, Snuffer is the
only witness on D.J.'s side who can give testimony regarding the key meeting that took place at
his offices. Given his "first-hand knowledge" of key, material facts, Snuffer "ought to be a
witness" in the present action and should therefore be disqualified.
B.

Snuffer's Disqualification Would Not Work a Substantial Hardship
on D J . Because the Possibility Was Foreseeable, D.J. Has Sufficient
Funds to Obtain New Counsel, and the New Counsel Would Have
Ample Time to Prepare for Trial.

Under the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, even where a lawyer is found to be a
necessary witness and the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice, the lawyer will not be
disqualified where (1) "[t]he testimony relates to an uncontested issue, (2) "[t]he testimony
relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case"; or (3) "[disqualification of
the lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client."
CONDUCT

UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

Rule 3.7. The Comment to the Rule states:

Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case,
the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the
8

lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such
prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be
given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both
parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness.
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 3.7, Comment. To determine whether the client

will suffer a "substantial hardship," the Utah Rules "recognize[] that a balancing is required
between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party." Id; see World Youth Day.
866 F. Supp. 1297 (noting that "the underlying purpose of Rule 3.7 . . . is to avoid the prejudice
associated with the jury confusion resulting from an attorney acting as both advocate and
witness.")
In the present case, the only possible issue with regard to the disqualification exceptions
set forth in Rule 3.7 is whether D.J. will suffer a hardship if Snuffer is disqualified. The first two
exceptions to the disqualification rule clearly do not apply because Snuffer's testimony would
relate to a contested issue, the Settlement Agreement, and because the testimony is in no way
related to the value of legal services rendered.
Snuffer's disqualification will not "work a substantial hardship" on D.J. for a number of
reasons. First, D.J. "could reasonably foresee" that Snuffer would be a witness since he was
involved in all aspects of the settlement negotiations. See Mast Dep. at 75, Ex. B; Christiansen
Dep. at 21, Ex. C. Second, D.J. has the financial means to obtain new counsel. Third, the Court
has not scheduled a trial date and discovery, other than that pursuant to Rule 56(f), has just
begun, so new counsel would have more than enough time to prepare for trial competently. By
early disqualification, new counsel would have time to conduct discovery to support its theory of
the case to the extent that might differ from Snuffer's. Furthermore, Westbrook would be
prejudiced if Snuffer was not disqualified and allowed to testify since his roles as both advocate
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and witness may confuse the jury. Such dual roles would cause Snuffer to "be easily subject to
impeachment for interest and thus lessens his effectiveness as a witness." Leonard, 707 P.2d at
653 (quoting Commonwealth v. Floyd, 431 A.2d 984, 989 (Pa. 1981)). Consequently, D.J. will
not suffer a "substantial hardship" if Snuffer is disqualified.
II.

SNUFFER'S CONTINUED REPRESENTATION OF DJ. WOULD
CONFUSE THE ROLE OF ADVOCATE AND WITNESS AND
THEREFORE TAINT ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
CASE.

Even where a court determines that a lawyer is a "necessary" witness, the court must still
analyze whether the proceedings could be conducted fairly were the lawyer allowed to
participate as both advocate and witness. Thus, the "critical inquiry is whether the litigation can
be conducted in fairness to all parties. Disqualification should not be imposed unless the claimed
misconduct in some way 'taints' the trial or the legal system." World Youth Day, 866 F. Supp.
at 1303 (emphasis added). Often, "there is a substantial risk that a jury will be confused by an
advocate also appearing as a witness. The jury may attribute too much or too little weight to [the
lawyer's] testimony because of his dual role." Id Furthermore, where any "pretrial activity
includes obtaining evidence which, if admitted at trial, would reveal the attorney's dual role," the
lawyer should be disqualified from participation in any such activities. Id; see also id. at 1304
(noting that "the testimony from oral depositions . . . cannot easily be taken and read into
evidence without revealing [the attorney's] identity as the deposing attorney").
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this matter would certainly confuse a jury
since he participated significantly in the events underlying this litigation. His testimony will be
crucial in determining the intended effect of the Settlement Agreement and whether Westbrook
made false representations to D.J. Thus, given that he was one of the principal negotiators of the
10

Settlement Agreement, the jury may attribute "too much or too little" weight to Snuffer's
testimony. This would be unfair for both sides and would certainly "taint" the trial.
Furthermore, Snuffer's continued participation in any pretrial activities would also be
unfair to both sides since these activities would likely reveal Snuffer's "dual role" as advocate
and witness. Not only will depositions in which he participated or may participate be read into
evidence, but Snuffer will himself probably be deposed. Additionally, D.J. has resisted
deposition questions involving Snuffer. See Mast Dep. at 34-36, 82, 197-98, Ex. B; Christiansen
Dep. at 32-33, Ex. C. This resistance and continued representation can cloak collusion between
fact witnesses (Mast and Snuffer) with the attorney-client communication privilege. In doing
such, Westbrook's ability to rebut parol evidence is severely affected. That Westbrook can place
its own representatives on the stand regarding the negotiations is not the same as being able to
place representatives of D.J. on the stand to obtain inconsistencies in their accounts of the
negotiations. These circumstances are unfair and will certainly taint the proceedings. Therefore,
Snuffer should be disqualified from any further participation in this case.
CONCLUSION
Snuffer's continued representation of D.J. in this case violates the ethical obligations of
Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and taints any further proceedings in this
case. Therefore, the Court should disqualify Denver Snuffer.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 2004.
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BENDINGER, CROCKETT, PETERSON,
GREENWOOD & CASEY, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801-533-8383

By_
Attorneys for Defendant DAEAVestbrook
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could include the filing of a motion in limine or other pleading to resolve the issue pnor to trial

Match ALL words
Search

^ Concurrently, the lawyer must determine if there is a conflict of interest under Rule 12

p FACTS: C, a former client of lawyer L, has sued L for legal malpractice for failure to protect client
assets from waste by a former spouse in a divorce case Us lawyer has advised C's current lawyer F
that F will be called as a witness on the issues of apportionment and contribution for her alleged
failure to protect the assets of the client she now represents

fl4 ANALYSIS: Us decision to call C's current lawyer F as a witness as to the issue of responsibility
of F for damages to her own client for malpractice engages Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
3 7 , "Lawyer as Witness," and 17 , "Conflict of Interest"

Rule 3 J , Lawyer as Witness. Rule 3_7 addresses the lawyer-witness issue
and provides

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a tnal in which the
lawyer is likely to be necessary as a witness unless

(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested
issue,
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and
value of legal services rendered in the case,
or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another
lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness
unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1 7 or Rule 1^9 .

1J5 Rule 3 7 does not automatically require withdrawal, i

Rather, Rule 37(a) provides that a

lawyer may not act as an advocate at trial if she is likely to be a "necessary" witness. Whether or not
this lawyer's testimony is necessary is a fact-specific question the lawyer being summoned must
resolve. If the testimony is duplicative and obtainable from other sources, her testimony may not be
necessary, and the lawyer should not withdraw or should not be subject to disqualification. 2

"The

naming of a party's attorney does not ipso facto render the named attorney a 'necessary witness'...
nor does the availability of other competent witnesses for the same testimony automatically render
the named attorney 'unnecessary'." 3

1(6 The attorney should not continue the representation when she is or ought to be a witness with
respect to issues that are not incidental or insignificant. "[Amplication of this rule does not depend on
whether an attorney will be called but rather, as the Code provides, on whether he 'ought to be called
as a witness* in the underlying action." 4

f7 Calling opposing counsel as a witness has been used as a bad-faith trial tactic to create a
disqualification of the client's lawyer to the disadvantage of one of the parties in the proceeding.
Some courts have described situations in which a lawyer ought to testify and be required to
withdraw, and those in which the lawyer may continue representation.

In In re Bahn, 5

the Texas Court of Appeals interpreted Texas Rule 3.08, which is similar to Utah's

rule for withdrawal when the lawyer may be called as a witness, to mean that the moving party had to
establish that the testimony was essential to the case and that it was not enough for the moving party
merely to announce its intention to call the attorney as a witness.

5(8 Similarly, a Georgia federal district court noted: "If by merely announcing his intention to call
opposing counsel as a witness an adversary could thereby orchestrate that counsel's disqualification
under the disciplinary Rule, such 'a device' might often be employed as a purely tactical
maneuver." ft In that case, the court also found that, when an adversary declares an intention to call
opposing counsel as a witness, the court should determine whether counsel's testimony is in fact
genuinely needed before ordering disqualification of counsel. As a result, disqualification has been
deemed to be an extreme measure to be imposed only when absolutely necessary. 7

1J9 If calling the lawyer as a witness is merely a bad-faith trial tactic, the analysis by the lawyer under
Rule 3 7 may be short. However, the lawyer should proceed cautiously and objectively where
protecting the client's interests is the primary concern. The current lawyer should obtain an early
resolution of this issue by withdrawing, if necessary, or by a motion in limine or other pleading to
resolve this issue well prior to trial, ft

1J10 Also, if disqualification of the current lawyer would work a substantial hardship on the client she
should not withdraw nor be disqualified. 9

Disqualification is generally limited to the lawyer acting

as tnal counsel Assuming no other rule disqualifies the lawyer, the lawyer may represent the client in
the pretnal stage of the case in which the lawyer might be called as a necessary trial witness and
retain another firm to act as tnal counsel 10. The current lawyer must evaluate the facts to
determine whether she is a necessary witness under Rule 3_7 and, to protect her client's interests,
prepare for the possibility she may need to withdraw or that she might be disqualified and new tnal
counsel be brought in

fl11 Rule U

, Conflict of Interest: Current Clients. Under Rule 1_7 , the current lawyer may be

precluded from continued representation in the pretrial or tnal stage It provides as follows

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a conflict of interest The conflict of interest exists if

(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client, or
(2) There is a significant nsk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third party
by a personal interest of the lawyer

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), the lawyer may represent if

(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client,
(2) Representation is not prohibited by law,
(3) The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim
by one client against another client represented by the lawyer
in the same litigation or another proceeding before a tribunal,
and
(4) Each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
wntmg.

1J12 Testimony from the current lawyer F regarding her possible liability to her client involves a
conflict of interest—namely, F's personal interest in avoiding a finding that she caused part of her
client's damages F must determine whether the client C, under these arcumstances, is likely to be
able to obtain objective advice from her as to whether or not that lawyer is liable to C for any part of
the losses he suffered, and whether C can or should consent to the conflict or waive any potential
claim against F

fl13 The comment to Rule 1_7 requires the current lawyer in the first instance to make the
determination of whether there is a conflict of interest, but the Rule also recognizes that, in some
cases, the current lawyer may need to advise the client to seek independent advice

Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or
carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer s
other responsibilities or interests

The critical questions are the likelihood that

a conflict will eventuate and if it does whether it will materially interfere with the
lawyer s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or
forecloses courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the
client

If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in senous question it
may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice

H

TJ14 Rule 1_7 permits the client to consent to the conflict and in effect, waive any claim he may
have against F, his current lawyer The ABA annotation to the Model Rules notes that informed
consent requires "full disclosure of the nature and implication of the lawyer's conflict Informed
consent denotes the client's agreement to the lawyer's proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation about the matenal risks of—and
reasonably available alternatives to—the proposed course of conduct" 12

1J15 The Rules recognize that there are circumstances under which the client cannot be requested to
give consent "[W]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the
representation under the circumstances the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement
or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent" 13

1J16 The comment to Rule 1_7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also provides

Consentabihty is typically determined by considenng whether the interests of the
clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their
informed consent burdened by a conflict of interest

representation is

prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the
lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation 14

if17 Since F may be subject to a claim that her actions damaged her client her ability to give
independent advice in the prosecution of the claim for damages against L is open to question If F
believes that she is subject to a bona fide malpractice claim, it is difficult to imagine circumstances
under which she could give independent advice 15

V 8 CONCLUSION: Under Rule 3 2 , it is the lawyer's responsibility to determine whether she is a
"necessary" witness, whether her testimony, if she is called relates to a contested issue and whether
it may be in conflict with her client's position The lawyer must also determine if her withdrawal would
create a substantial hardship for her client As these questions are fact-specific, the Committee
cannot express a bnght-line rule It is the lawyer's responsibility to analyze the facts under the
application of Rules 1_7 and 3_7 and the guidelines set forth above to determine if she must
withdraw under the circumstances

1J19 Under Rule 1_7 , it is the responsibility of the lawyer to determine whether she is precluded from
continuing representation because of a conflict of interest If the claim prompting the notice that the
lawyer will be called as a witness is not made in bad faith and the lawyer intends to seek the client's
consent, it would be prudent for the lawyer to advise her client to seek independent advice as to
whether given the relevant facts, it is reasonable to consent to the conflict However, not every
conflict of interest under Rule 17 may be consented to by a client We recommend that, pnor to
requesting any consent, the lawyer in this circumstance advise the client to seek independent advice
from an attorney on the requested consent

Footnotes
1_ We note the difference between an ethical obligation to withdraw as counsel under certain
circumstances and the legal issue of whether a presiding tnbunal would order a disqualification of the
lawyer They are closely connected, but not congruent As a matter of law, disqualification of a
lawyer in an ongoing litigation is not within the purview of the Committee.

2_ Mazurkiewfcz v New York Transit Auth, 806 F Supp 1093 (S D N Y 1992), Chappeli v
Cosgrove, 916 P 2d 836 (N M 1996)

3_ Colo Bar Assoc Formal Op 78, www cobar orq/static/comms/ethics/fo/fo 78 htm (Rev May
10, 1997) In a similar case, the Delaware State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics
advised the lawyer not to undertake representation Del St Bar Assoc Comm Op 1991-4,
www dsba orq/ethics91-4 pdf We believe that the analysis of the opinion is sound However, in
cases where, as here, representation has already been undertaken, disqualification or withdrawal is
not automatic

4.

State v Leonard, 707 P 2d 650, 653 (Utah 1985) (quoting Groper v Taff, 717 F 2d 1415, 1418

(D C Cir 1983)) This case was decided under the previous Code of Professional Responsibility,
which contained a provision similar to the current Rule 3J7

5_ 13 S W 3d 865 (Tex App 2000)

6_ Connellv Clairol, Inc, 440 F Supp 17, 18 n 1 (N D Ga 1977)

7.

Weeks v Samsung Heavy Industry Co, Ltd, 909 F Supp. 582 (N W III 1996), Zunch Ins Co

v Knotts, 52 S W 3d 555 (Ky 2001)

8_ If a motion to disqualify is filed by the opposing lawyer, the burden to establish that counsel's
continuing in the case would violate the disciplinary rules falls on the party seeking to have the
opposing counsel disqualified Zions First Nat Bank, N A v United Health Clubs, 505 F Supp 138,
140 (D Pa 1981) In Zions, the court explained that the moving party has the burden because the
rule was not created as a way for a lawyer to get opposing counsel disqualified, and that granting
such a motion without a clear showing that the continued representation is impermissible would
undermine the integnty of the rule

9.

10

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 3 7(a)(3)

It is also possible to have another lawyer in the withdrawing lawyer's firm to represent the client

at tnal, so long as there is no Rule ±2 (conflict) or Rule 1_9 (former client) problem Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct 3 7(b) & cmt 5

11

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1_7 , cmt

12

ABA Ann Model Rules of Professional Conduct 135 (5th ed 2002)

13

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1_7 , cmt 4

14

ABA Model rules of Professional Conduct 1 7, cmt [15] (2002) This is not part of the current

Utah Rules, but is consistent with Utah Rule 1_7

15

See, e g, The ABA/BWA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct 51 407 (suggesting that a

lawyer faced with threatened malpractice action in the course of representing a client should
disqualify herself)
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant filed a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel on
the grounds of conflict of interest of a former client under N.Y. Code Prof. Resp. DR 5108 and N.Y. Code Prof. Resp. DR 5-102, withdrawal of counsel when the lawyer became
a witness.
OVERVIEW: Plaintiffs commenced an action against defendant for restitution for
settlement money paid on behalf of defendant. Defendant filed a motion to disqualify
plaintiffs' counsel for violating N.Y. Code Prof. Resp. DR 5-108. Defendant contended
that plaintiffs' counsel was his former lawyer and had gained knowledge of confidential
matters. Defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel was granted. The court held
that the lawyer had represented defendant for a period of time in both the criminal and
civil litigation. Thus, the court held that defendant was a former client of the attorney
and that the facts that gave rise to the material issues in both present action and the
prior criminal action were practically the same, such that a substantial relationship
existed between the representations. The court held that after defendant established he
was a former client and that there was a substantial relationship between the prior and
present lawsuits, the receipt of confidential information was presumed. Further, the court
held that the attorney was a witness and was disqualified from representing plaintiffs.
OUTCOME: The court granted defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel.
CORE TERMS: promissory note, confidences, imparted, disqualification, substantial
relationship, prior representation, confidential information, New York Disciplinary Rule, former
client, disqualified, disqualify/ disqualification motion, lawsuit, settlement, privileged
information, partnership, cooperative, co-venturer, undisputed, nullified, co-party, presumed,
execute, inquire, tainted, movant, rebut, prongs, motion to disqualify, agreed to represent
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes
Civil Procedure > Counsel *m
HWi

i T h e United States Appeals Court for the Second Circuit has noted that the
disqualification of an attorney is a serious matter which necessarily requires the
court to balance the right of a party to a lawsuit to retain counsel of its choice
against the need to insure the integrity of the legal proceedings. A disqualification
motion will be granted only if the facts present a real risk that the trial will be
tainted. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Counsel *m
HN2

±Where a disqualification motion is based on the need to preserve client confidences,
an attorney may be disqualified from representing a client if there is a "substantial
relationship" between the particular case and a prior representation. The
relationship between the two representations is "substantial" if: (1) the moving
party is a former client of the adverse party's counsel; (2) there is a substantial
relationship between the subject matter of the counsel's prior representation of the
moving party and the issues in the present lawsuit; and, (3) the attorney whose
disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to have had access to,
relevant privileged information in the course of his prior representation of the
Client. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Counsel m
H/V3

±Although the "substantial relationship" test is generally considered to be threepronged, the third requirement is presumed if the first two prongs are
met.

More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Counsel ^ 3
w/V4

iWhen an attorney was personally in control of a prior representation, there is an
irrebuttable presumption that the attorney had access to confidential
information. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Counsel <w3
H 5

^ ±Under N.Y. Code Prof. Resp. DR 5-102(A), an attorney must be disqualified if it is
obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of
his client. An attorney ought to testify on behalf of his client if his testimony could
be significantly useful to his client, and is necessary to the client's case. A finding of
necessity takes into account such factors as the availability of other testimony,
weight of the testimony, and significance of the matters. Most importantly, the
standard as to whether an attorney who is a possible witness is bound to withdraw
from the case is not whether he will be called but whether he "ought" to be
called. More Like This Headnote

COUNSEL: [ * 1 ] For Plaintiffs: JUDD BURSTEIN, P.C., New York, New York Of Counsel: Kim
P. Bonstrom, Esq.
For Defendant: PRO SE
JUDGES: KEENAN
OPINIONBY: JOHN F. KEENAN
OPINION: OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel, Judd Burstein, P.C.,
pursuant to New York Disciplinary Rule 5-108 ("Conflict of Interest - Former Client") and New
York Disciplinary Rule 5-102 ("Withdrawal of Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a Witness").
Defendant brings this motion in response to plaintiffs' opposition to defendant's motion to
dismiss their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The underlying action involves
defendant's alleged failure to honor a $ 400,000 promissory note that he allegedly signed in
favor of plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs'

counsel is granted.
BACKGROUND
In 1988, defendant, Clifton Craig Canant ("Canant"), was employed in New York by Crossland
Savings Bank ("Crossland"). In June of 1988, non-party Siegfried Tiuman ("Siegfried") and
Canant conspired to embezzle over $ 400,000 from Crossland and channel such funds into the
bank account of Siegfried's [*2] parents, Erich and Sofia Tiuman ("Tiumans"), who are the
plaintiffs in this matter. During May of 1989, Crossland discovered the theft and filed a civil
suit against Canant and Siegfried. See Crossland Savings, FSB v. Canant, Index No. 11804/89
(Sup. Ct. Kings Co.). This act was also the subject of a criminal investigation and prosecution.
See United States v. Canant, 90 Cr. 747-01 (S.D.N.Y.) (JSM). Judd Burstein, P.C. ("Burstein")
agreed to represent both Canant and Siegfried in the pending civil and criminal cases. See
Defendant's Reply Affidavit in Further Support of Motion to Disqualify, Exhibit A. Upon the
discovery that plaintiffs' bank account had been utilized in connection with the embezzlement,
Crossland impleaded the Tiumans into the civil action. Subsequently, Burstein also agreed to
represent the Tiumans.
On or about June 22, 1989, the parties reached a settlement in the Crossland action, pursuant
to which the Tiumans agreed to make full restitution, on behalf of themselves, Canant, and
Siegfried. According to the Tiumans, in agreeing to make restitution on behalf of Canant, they
demanded that Canant promise to reimburse them for the full amount of the [*3] monies
paid in settlement of the Crossland action. The Tiumans further assert that Canant agreed
and, on or about June 14, 1989, executed a promissory note evidencing his obligation to repay
the Tiumans. Canant is unable to recall the terms and conditions of the promissory note.
Neither party has produced a copy of the promissory note in either the pleadings or motion
papers.
In connection with the criminal matter, plaintiffs acknowledge that Mr. Burstein arranged a
meeting between himself, Canant, and the United States Attorney's Office on or about July 13,
1989 in an effort to dissuade the Government from prosecuting Canant. See Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel, at 34. Neither that meeting nor subsequent conversations with the United States Attorney proved
fruitful, as Canant and Siegfried were ultimately indicted. On December 5, 1989, Burstein
claims to have written Canant to advise him that he would no longer represent him and that
Canant should obtain new counsel as soon as possible. See Affidavit of Kim P. Bonstrom.
Canant admits that in 1990 he was notified by Burstein that Burstein could no longer [*4]
represent either him or Siegfried Tiuman "because Burstein saw a conflict in representing
[them] jointly in [their] criminal cases." See Defendant's Request for Pre-Motion Conference.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts that Burstein, as his former lawyer, has gained knowledge of confidential
matters, thus putting the Tiumans at an unfair advantage in conflict with New York
Disciplinary Rule 5-108. In addition, defendant claims that Burstein will have to appear as a
witness at trial on this matter, and thus should withdraw as counsel pursuant to New York
Disciplinary Rule 5-102.
A. Former Client Conflict
1. Applicable Legal Standard
HN1

TThe Second Circuit has noted that "the disqualification of an attorney is a serious matter
which necessarily requires the court to balance the right of a party to a lawsuit to retain
counsel of its choice against the need to insure the integrity of the legal proceedings."
Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1978). A disqualification

motion will be granted only if the facts present a real risk that the trial will be tainted. See
Board of Educ. v. IMyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). [*5]
HN2

*+\Nhere a disqualification motion is based on the need to preserve client confidences, an
attorney may be disqualified from representing a client if there is a "substantial relationship"
between the particular case and a prior representation. The relationship between the two
representations is "substantial" if:
(1) the moving party is a former client of the adverse party's counsel;
(2) there is a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the counsel's
prior representation of the moving party and the issues in the present lawsuit;
[and]
(3) the attorney whose disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to
have had access to, relevant privileged information in the course of his prior
representation of the client.

Evans v. Artek Systems Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983). " " ^ A l t h o u g h the
"substantial relationship" test is generally considered to be three-pronged, the third
requirement is presumed if the first two prongs are met. See Ernie Indus., Inc. v. Patentex,
Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973)
The Second Circuit suggests that before the "substantial relationship" test is even implicated,
[ * 6 ] it must be shown that the attorney who is the subject of the disqualification motion was
in a position where he could have received information that his former client might reasonably
have assumed the attorney would withhold from the present client. Allegaert v. Perot, 565
F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977). "This element becomes an issue especially in cases where a
partnership, joint venture or other cooperative effort breaks up, or where two former coparties to a litigation later sue each other." United States Football League v. National Football
League 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1452 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In cases where counsel for a combined
effort later represents one of the former co-venturers in ensuing litigation, motions to
disqualify the attorney because of his receipt of confidences from the movant during the
course of the cooperative venture must fail unless the movant is able to show that he
reasonably expected that any information he imparted to the attorney would not be revealed
to his former co-venturer in the course of prior representation. See id. at 1452.
2. Analysis
In the present [ * 7 ] case, Judd Burstein represented Canant for a period of time in both the
criminal litigation, where Canant was an indicted defendant, and the civil litigation, where
Canant was a defendant and the Tiumans were impleaded defendants. Canant now asserts
that Burstein is revealing confidences relating to his residency that he imparted to Burstein
during Burstein's representation of him in the criminal matter. Although Canant's and the
Tiumans' co-party status in the civil matter permits Burstein to inform the Tiumans of any
information Canant imparted to Burstein concerning the civil matter, this cannot be said of
information imparted by Canant to Burstein in preparation for Canant's criminal prosecution.
Of concern, then, is the possibility that Burstein will use confidences gained in the prior
criminal representation to the detriment of Canant in the pending litigation and in violation of
D.R. 5-108.
Canant easily meets the first two prongs of the substantial relationship test: it is undisputed
that he is a former client of Burstein and clear that the facts giving rise to the material issues

in both the present action and the prior criminal action are practically the same, such that
[ * 8 ] a substantial relationship exists between the representations. See United States
Football League, 605 F. Supp. at 1459.
As mentioned above, because Canant has established that he was a former client of Burstein
and that there is a substantial relationship between the prior and present lawsuits, the law
need not inquire whether Burstein in fact received confidential information, because the
receipt of such information is presumed. See Ernie Indus., 478 F.2d at 571. "Only in this
manner can the lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating
to privileged communications be maintained." T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Therefore, the presumption that Canant
imparted to Burstein confidential information relevant to the present suit arises in order to
forestall a direct inquiry into whether confidential information was in fact transmitted by
Canant. See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 903 (1981). [ * 9 ]
H/V4

?When an attorney was personally in control of a prior representation, there is an
irrebuttable presumption that the attorney had access to confidential information. See
Yaretsky v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 24, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Government of India v. Cook Indus.,
Inc. 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); see also
Cheng, 631 F.2d at 1056 ("It is well established that a court may not inquire into the nature of
the confidences alleged to have been revealed to the tainted attorney."). Even if this
presumption is rebuttable, as at least one court has held, see Lemelson v. Synergistics
Research Corp, 504 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), Burstein fails to rebut it. In
response to the allegation that Canant imparted confidences to Burstein regarding his choice
of domicile, plaintiffs contend that such supposed confidences were a matter of public record
and that such confidences were also imparted by Canant to the plaintiffs. See Plaintiffs'
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion [ * 1 0 ] to Disqualify Plaintiffs'
Counsel at 12-13. As a general rule, however, the attorney-client privilege "is not nullified by
the fact that the circumstances to be disclosed are part of a public record, or that there are
other available sources for such information . . . ." Ernie Indus., Inc., 478 F.2d at 572-73; NCK
Org., Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1976). Even if all confidential information to
which Burstein had access was independently known by the plaintiffs, Canant's privilege in this
information as disclosed to his attorney Burstein is not thereby nullified. See NCK Org., 542
F.2d at 133.
As a result, plaintiffs fail to rebut the presumption that Burstein did have access to relevant
privileged information in the course of his prior representation of Canant. Use of Canant's
confidences would give the plaintiffs an unfair advantage in this substantially related,
subsequent representation and would threaten the integrity of these proceedings. Thus, the
Court finds that disqualification is an appropriate remedy. See NCK Org., 542 F.2d at 133;
Yaretsky, 525 F. Supp. at 29. [ * 1 1 ]
B. Lawyer's Possible Appearance as a Witness
As an independent basis for disqualification, defendant asserts that Burstein ought to be called
as a witness and must, therefore, be disqualified as required by New York Disciplinary Rule 5102(A).
" A ^ U n d e r Q.R. 5-102(A), an attorney must be disqualified if "it is obvious that he or a lawyer
in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client. . . ." D.R. 5-102(A). "An
attorney ought to testify on behalf of his client if his testimony could be significantly useful to
his client," MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), and is
necessary to the client's case. See S&S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. 777 S.H. Corp., 69
N.Y.2d 437, 445, 508 N.E.2d 647, 515 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1987). A finding of necessity takes into
account such factors as the availability of other testimony, weight of the testimony, and

significance of the matters. See id. at 446. Most importantly, the standard as to whether an
attorney who is a possible witness is bound to withdraw from the case is not whether he will
be called but whether he [ * 1 2 ] "ought" to be called. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d
1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 19751.
Disqualification is generally inappropriate if an attorney's testimony would merely corroborate
the testimony of others. See Munk v. Goldome Nat'l Corp., 697 F. Supp. 784, 787 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). Similarly, a lawyer who merely observed the negotiations and reviewed draft
agreements need not be disqualified. See American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins.
Co., 634 F. Supp. 112f 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). However, a lawyer should be disqualified if he
negotiates, executes, and administers a contract, and is the key witness at trial. See Acme
Analgesics, Ltd. v. Lemmon Co., 602 F. Supp. 306, 306-307 (S.D.N.Y. 19851.
It is undisputed that Burstein negotiated and executed the promissory note during his
concurrent representation of Canant, Siegfried and the Tiumans. As a result, Burstein has
unique knowledge about the parties' decision to enter into a settlement and execute a
promissory note. In addition, the promissory note has yet to be produced by either party.
Because the resolution [ * 1 3 ] of this litigation will turn on the enforceability of the promissory
note, absent the promissory note itself, it appears at this stage that Burstein "ought" to be
called as a witness. Accordingly, D.R. 5-102(A) presents additional grounds for Burstein's
disqualification from this action. See Acme Analgesics, 602 F. Supp. at 307.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons aforementioned, defendant's motion is granted. Plaintiffs have thirty days
from the date of this Opinion and Order to secure alternate counsel. Defendant is to use this
thirty-day period to submit reply papers on his motion to dismiss, if he intends to submit such
papers.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
May 19, 1994
JOHN F. KEENAN
U.S.DJ.
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